Why the betrayal of TE Lawrence sowed the seeds of today's Middle East conflicts

The truth about how Britain sold out a hero for Israel's benefit
At the start, he was the most unpromising of military heroes: small, intellectual, shy, noted for his slovenly dress and a lack of regard for military hierarchy or status. But TE Lawrence invented a new kind of warfare, played a pivotal role in the First World War and emerged from the deadliest conflict in history as – probably – the greatest and most celebrated public hero of the age.
There was something almost mythical about him. One story illustrates it. When Allied troops stormed the Ottoman stronghold of Aqaba – with Lawrence at the head of an Arab force – tensions flared between British soldiers and their ostensible Arab allies. The British – believing themselves under attack – were about to retaliate. The consequences would have been catastrophic.
Suddenly, a figure dressed in white robes stepped into the mayhem, and raised his hand. Instantly, the tension subsided. TE Lawrence – an Englishman who had, from his mid-teens, immersed himself in the language, culture and traditions of the Arab world – saved the day.
The British, believing the Ottoman Turks represented a threat to the control of Egypt, encouraged the Arabs to rise against their Turkish colonial masters, arming and supplying them.
“The capture of Aqaba is the most magnificent illustration of his philosophy,” says writer and Conservative MP Rory Stewart, who walked across Iran and Afghanistan, immersing himself in the languages and traditions of a profoundly non-Western culture. Aqaba, he says, demonstrates Lawrence’s mastery of guerrilla warfare, in which a small insurgent force can inflict damage on a much larger, conventional army and then melt back into the local population.
“It was an extraordinary flanking manoeuvre across hundreds of miles of desert, moving through occupied territory and attacking a garrison town in the heart of the Ottoman empire from the most unexpected direction. It showed imagination, speed, risk: Aqaba is the real symbol of Lawrence’s brilliance.”
The keys to his relationship with the Arabs with whom he fought are described in his famous Twenty Seven Articles, where he states, “Learn all you can… Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect enquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their illusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks.” Lawrence immersed himself so profoundly that he acted, spoke, thought and lived as an Arab.
Rory Stewart, who a decade ago served as a deputy provincial governor in Iraq during the US-led occupation, became disillusioned with the West’s attempts to remake the Arab world in its own image. “Lawrence is brutally honest about the realities of occupation,” he argues. “He identifies how unpopular it can be. We imagine ourselves as well intentioned. But the basic lesson of Lawrence is humility.
“He understood the limitations of what Western powers could do. He had faith in other peoples. He believed in Arabs as an impressive, intelligent, honourable people, who had an extraordinary civilisation. He believed interfering foreigners would make things not better, but worse. He was right.”
Lawrence’s dream was that he would become the prophet of a movement that would deliver independence to the Arabs. Even as he was fighting in the desert, this dream was betrayed and Britain and France conspired to partition liberated Arabia into their respective spheres of influence. Lawrence raged: “We asked them to fight on the basis of a lie.”
By the war’s end, he was, reluctantly, a celebrity. Millions went to see Lawrence of Arabia, the David Lean film about his exploits, which marks its 50th anniversary this year. He was lionised in the USA. After a war that had sent a generation of young men to futile deaths, Lawrence became the hero that the British empire craved. But his warnings – that Britain’s Arab allies had been betrayed by the postwar settlement – went unheeded and to this day cast a shadow over the West’s relationship with the Arab world.

Palestine after 1945
On the demise of the League of Nations in 1946 Britain, as the mandatory power, had two options. Either it could grant independence to Palestine, as had been done in the case of all the other A Class Mandates - Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan - or it could place Palestine under trusteeship. Sectarian conflict made independence impossible. Britain then proposed trusteeship for a five year period. In so doing Britain explained:
"throughout the period of the Mandatory rule in Palestine it has been the object of His Majesty's government to lay the  foundations for an independent Palestinian state in which Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal rights."
When this proposal was rejected by both Arabs and Jews, Britain asked the United Nations to make recommendations on the future of Palestine. 
On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181(II) by a vote of 33 (including France, USA and USSR) to 13 (including all Arab States) with 10 abstentions (including China and the UK), which provided for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, an economic union between them and the internationalisation of Jerusalem under United Nations administration. The Mandate was to terminate on the withdrawal of Britain and not later than 1 August 1948.
Resolution 181(II) was accepted by the Zionist League on behalf of the Jewish community but was rejected by the Arab community of Palestine and by Arab States. This was not surprising as the partition plan offered the Jewish community comprising 33 per cent of the population of Palestine 57 per cent of the land and 84 per cent of the cultivatable land. According to Ernest Bevin, Britain's Foreign Minister, it was "manifestly unfair to the Arabs".
The legality of Resolution 181(II) was and still is debated hotly by international lawyers. Moreover, it was clearly impossible to implement it in the face of Arab opposition. Attention then returned to the possibility of a trusteeship agreement and on 20 April 1948 the US introduced  the text of a draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine before the General Assembly which envisaged a single Palestinian state. Time was, however, running out as the United Kingdom had announced that it would evacuate its administration at midnight on 14 May.
Thus, at midnight on 14 May 1948 Israel declared its independence, invoking Resolution 181 (II) in support. From the outset, however, it was clear that the new state of Israel had no intention of abiding by the terms of the Resolution. The new state was recognised immediately by President Truman of the United States, much to the surprise and consternation of the State Department, which had warned against premature recognition. Two days later Israel was recognised by the Soviet Union.
Israel's declaration of independence was followed by hostilities between the new state and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, which were brought to an end by the Armistice Agreements of 1949, and which resulted in the state of Israel occupying much more of Palestine than was envisaged by Resolution 181 (II). On 11 May 1949 Israel was admitted to the United Nations, with Britain abstaining in both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

It is abundantly clear that Britain reneged on the agreements given by both Lawrence and also General Allenby.
The U.N Treaty mentioned above is highly questionable and the only conclusion any thinking person can come to is this ISRAEL IS AN ILLEGAL STATE!
Israel has usurped its already illegal standing by further expanding its borders and carrying on a Genocidal War against the non-Jewish people of Palestine.
BOYCOTT ISRAEL - STAND BY BRITAIN'S PROMISES!